\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eIn \u003c/b\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u003ci\u003eThe Triumph of Improvisation\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/b\u003e\u003cb\u003e, James Graham Wilson takes a long view of the end of the Cold War, from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 to Operation Desert Storm in January 1991.\u003c/b\u003e Drawing on deep archival research and recently declassified papers, Wilson argues that adaptation, improvisation, and engagement by individuals in positions of power ended the specter of a nuclear holocaust. Amid ambivalence and uncertainty, Mikhail Gorbachev, Ronald Reagan, George Shultz, and George H. W. Bushâand a host of other actorsâengaged with adversaries and adapted to a rapidly changing international environment and information age in which global capitalism recovered as command economies failed. \u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eEschewing the notion of a coherent grand strategy to end the Cold War, Wilson paints a vivid portrait of how leaders made choices; some made poor choices while others reacted prudently, imaginatively, and courageously to events they did not foresee. A book about the burdens of responsibility, the obstacles of domestic politics, and the human qualities of leadership, \u003ci\u003eThe Triumph of Improvisation\u003c/i\u003e concludes with a chapter describing how George H. W. Bush oversaw the construction of a new configuration of power after the fall of the Berlin Wall, one that resolved the fundamental components of the Cold War on Washington's terms.\u003c/p\u003e
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